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suicide rates in most European countries, particularly in regions with higher levels of job loss (Chang et al., 2013) , and among men, especially unemployed 'family breadwinners' or at risk of eviction (e.g. Rachiotis et al., 2015) . High increase in suicide rates was registered among males in Spain -14% higher in 2012 compared to the year before (Ruiz-Pérez et al., 2017 ) -and in Greece, 35% higher in 2012 compared to 2010 (Rachiotis et al., 2015 .
The so-called 'Great Recession' in these countries produced a social climate of increasing distress and fear about the further evolution of the economic situation, with experts speculating the possibility of their country being expelled from the euro, the unavailability of payments to officials, pensions and intervention of the national government by the Troika. In many cities, new food banks were created to face the increasing number of households needing food, due to the rise of unemployment and precarity (see Kousis and Paschou, this volume) . Across several countries, a vast 4 majority of the population felt that, for the first time in decades, one generation lived worse than previous generations. In fact, the important intergenerational improvement of income taking place after the Second World War was interrupted for the generation born in the early 80's, particularly in countries such as Greece, Spain, and Italy, and, to a lesser extent, in the United Kingdom, Denmark or Finland (Rahman & Tomlinson, 2018 ).
An important part of the population perceived austerity as an exogenous shock, directly producing a decline of their living standards. The progressive erosion of political support among the European population since the 1990's is well documented (e.g.
Norris, 2011), as well as how this was aggravated by the economic crisis and the increasing distrust in political institutions and elites (Lobera, 2015) . As Andretta and della Porta (2015: 49) note, the spreading of anti-austerity protests in many countries 'has brought about a renewed attention of the structural socio-economic transformations producing different grievances and collective action', mostly paying attention to grievance interpretation and framing. Understanding the acute connection between two 'intertwined crises', political and economic -as stressed by many analyses (e.g. Flesher Fominaya, 2017; della Porta, 2015; Lobera, 2011a) -is essential in explaining the European anti-austerity protests and the way they framed grievances.
Emotions
Emotions occupied a relevant place in most analysis of the anti-austerity mobilizations, particularly of the so-called 'square movements', such as the Indignados mobilizations in Spain (also known as 15M movement), the Aganaktismeni in Greece, and hundreds of Occupy mobilizations in several other countries, including notably Britain and Belgium.
Arguably, there is nothing new about the central role emotions played in these movements (Cossarini, 2014) ; there are no politics nor political theory without emotions.
But, certainly, the study of this protest cycle increased the already growing interest since late 1990's regarding the role of emotions in mobilization, and more broadly in all social 5 action, as a provider of both motivation and goals (Jasper, 1998) . Emotions and passion, as much as interests and ideologies, drive individuals to mobilize and join collective actions (Goodwin et al., 2004) .
Research in Greece and Spain showed that protestors were motivated to join collective mobilizations by their 'moral outrage', followed by anger and sadness (Simiti, 2015: 26; Likki, 2013: 10-11) . Some scholars, like Castells (2012) and Langman (2013) , included 'hope' as one of most defining emotions of the square movements, although evidence showed low levels of this emotion among the participants, suggesting that despite their mobilization they 'were reserved in their hopes' that their main grievances would be resolved soon (Likki, 2013:11 ).
Spain's ¡Democracia Real Ya! (Real Democracy Now), one of the platforms that played a key initiator role in the mobilizations, called in these terms for an end of citizen apathy, and a facing up to the unjust situation:
We can vote, but we don't have a voice. (…) We don't understand why we need to pay the bills of a crisis whose authors continue to enjoy record benefits. We are The worst possible outlook is indifference that says, 'I can't do anything about it; I'll just get by.' Behaving like that deprives you of one of the essentials of being human: the capacity and the freedom to feel outraged. That freedom is indispensable, as is the political involvement that goes with it.
Certainly, a 'strategic' vision was present within the initiating platforms and autonomous movements in this translation of the rapidly spreading 'Indignation' frames, aimed to mobilize emotions to encourage participation (Cossarini, 2014; Tejerina & Perugorría, 2017) . Doing so, they obtained some cases of great success of participation, such as the Spanish Indignados movement. They strategically framed and mobilized collective emotions, increasing group solidarity and strengthening the 'emotional energy' of collective actions (Collins, 2001) .
Humour also played an instrumental role in some mobilizations, which combined indignation directed at politicians and bankers with a wide range of strategically designed actions and protests. As Romanos (2016a: e039) notes for the Spanish case, activists organized 'workshops to promote imaginative and ironic messages on placards, performances explicitly seeking an emotional connection to the public, the development of specific humour-driven initiatives within the committees, and the application of skills and technical expertise related to advertising and distribution of content on the Internet'. Strategic use of humour in political protest (Hart, 2007) has been remarkably more visible and analysed in the last decades (e.g. Bruner 2005 , Flesher Fominaya 2007 , Romanos, 2016a .
Due to the unpredictable nature of 'cycles of contention', emotions may evolve differently based on the responses of elites, opponents, and potential allies (Tarrow, 2011: 201) , and result in new positive or negative emotions. As an example of evolution of negative emotions, a British activist refers to the interplay between police response, media representation, public opinion, and self-reflexivity within the movement: 'Our reaction against police intimidation was quite forceful and was perceived as quite threatening to people outside of the activist milieu, and that created tensions within the movement' (Cammaerts, 2018: 177) . During the protests, many ordinary citizens expressed a sense of 'despair and submission': 'We know we are being exploited, but we are aware also that there is absolutely nothing we can do about it ' (2018: 178) .
According to some activists, this 'fatalistic submission' may be explained by a 'deliberately cultivated collective depression' to accept the existing situation (Fisher, 2014 ). Yet, some scholars have studied the recent expansion of the state's power to control youth dissent by extending the reach of criminal law, surveillance of public spaces, 'gag laws' and other sources of repression (e.g. Bessant & Grasso, 2018) . Portos and Calvo (2018: 49) have analysed recent institutional actions in Spain aimed at stimulating the perception of threat around the young, as part of a what they call a new 'regime of governance of young people', where fear, soft repression, hard punishment, securitization and surveillance are key elements. In this vein, Cammaerts (2018: 178) warns that sentiments of powerlessness among the population are often accompanied by an "anger and sense of victimhood which desperately looks for others to blame (cf.
immigrants or those on benefits)", diverting the emotional energy of anti-austerity protests out of the elites.
In sum, the analysis of anti-austerity protests has led to an increasing interest in the affective and emotional dimensions, both as dependent and independent variables. Certainly, the emotions of the participants (and non-participants) can be modified or intensified by the protests (Jasper, 1998; Collins, 2001; della Porta 2008) , and the dynamics of the protests are affected by changes in the emotions of potential participants. Likewise, it is crucial to obtain a deeper understanding of how mobilization dynamics are affected by changes in the public opinion climate (e.g. Snow et al., 1986; Gamson, 1992) , since the way that non-activist citizens react may have an important effect on the evolution of the contentious process (Gamson, 1992; Koopmans, 2004) .
Institutional left and autonomous actors
Even though the financial crisis in Europe ignited in 2008, the massive responses in the streets were not immediate. Some trade unions' protests, student mobilizations, and the Iceland 'Saucepan Revolution' in 2009-10 were the predecessors of the anti-austerity 8 cycle of contention (Zamponi, 2012; Júlíusson & Helgason, 2013) . Mostly, the successive calls for protests, both from the institutional left (i.e. trade unions and smaller parties) and from the autonomous movements, did not include massive participation until the May 5, 2010 general strike in Greece (heavily affected early in the process).
General strikes and mass demonstrations swept the country for weeks -accompanied by controversial and deadly police actions -protesting against the government plans to cut public spending and raise taxes in exchange for a €110 billion bail-out by the Troika, aimed at solving the Greek debt crisis. Secondly, a declining public trust in unions had reduced its mobilizing capacity in several countries (della Porta, 2012; Lobera, 2011b) . This situation led unions to deploy new alliances with emerging autonomous groups, mostly with national or regional scopes. In certain cases, the position of the unions was visible and strong, as in most Portuguese protests and, later, the French Nuit Debout. In other cases, such as the Spanish mareas cívicas ('civic tides') and, more recently, the French Gilets jaunes, banners or symbols representing unions were actively rejected in their collective selfrepresentation.
The Gilets jaunes movement was initiated by individual, inexperienced activists who used social media to create a politicized collective identity, first starting a change.org petition against the increase in fuel prices, followed by a Facebook event to 'block all roads', and a viral video that suggested the use of the highly-visible yellow vests as a sign of a common identity. This movement was not associated with a specific political party or trade union. In these mobilizations -with vast proportions of 
Novel features of Anti-Austerity protests
The literature that has emerged on square movements has often portrayed them as unique (e.g. Langman, 2013; Perugorría & Tejerina, 2013) . Anduiza et. al (2014) , present evidence of some characteristics in the Spanish 15M that defy the established principles of the collective action paradigm: the 15M staging organizations were recently created, without formal membership and mainly online presence, they mobilized younger, more educated and less politically involved participants, and the main mobilization channels were personal contact and online social networks rather than co-members or broadcast media.
Activist use of digital media
Activist use of digital media played an instrumental role in the rapid diffusion of the protests and the mobilization of participants (see Casero-Ripollés, in this volume): e.g. (Milan, 2015) . In any case, activist uses of digital tools in the square movements were not detached from physical reality, since they were understood as a part of a broader project of re-appropriation of public space, which also involved assembling around 'occupied' places (Gerbaudo, 2012) .
Antioligarchic view of citizenship and new cross-class alliances
The financial crisis fuelled a pre-existent democratic crisis. Public opinion data shows that the crisis was mostly perceived as a political crisis, not just an austerity crisis (Lobera & Ferrándiz, 2013) . In this context, contesting 'really existing democracy' engendered more visible outcomes than resisting austerity, to the point that, as Flesher The emergence of the 'citizenism' as a strategic frame (e.g. Taibo, 2013) implied a more political than economic emphasis of the discourse (Gerbaudo, 2017) . This brought little focus in the European sphere, since citizenism is almost implicitly oriented to the national or local level. It is not that the EU and the Troika are not also blamed for the crisis and austerity, but the nation state is much more central as a stage and focus of collective action (Flesher Fominaya, 2015; 2017) . Arguably, this raises a risk of national retrenchment, with possible negative consequences for the efficacy that social movements have in facing transnational power structures (Gerbaudo & Pianta, 2015) .
In countries with a greater weight of the institutionalized left, though, there were significant anti-Troika mobilizations, including the 'Fuck the Troika' protests in Portugal 
Continuities and breaks
Existing scholarship on square movements has mostly stressed the elements of continuity with the GJM or the so-called anti-globalization protests, particularly with autonomous movements (see Daphi, this volume; see Giugni and Grasso, this volume). Some elements of continuity were 'the presence of common activists in both movements […] and the strong cultural influence of the anti-globalisation movement on contemporary practices' (Gerbaudo, 2017: 5), particularly on diagnostic framing, repertoires, and forms of organization (Zamponi & Daphi, 2014) . Flesher Fominaya (2017: 2) emphasizes the fact that 'the "twin" crises' were framed 'synergistically' as a continuation of the 'double critique levelled by the GJM against neoliberal capitalist globalization and illegitimate, ineffective representative democracy', but now framed within the aftermath of the austerity policies. Yet, student movements in Italy and Spain played key roles in influencing the respective anti-austerity mobilizations and discourse in those countries, transforming 'the anti-neoliberal discourse' of the GJM into 'an antiausterity discourse ' (Zamponi & Fernández, 2016) .
As Tejerina et al. (2013: 381) Arguably, these aspects would be embedded in a broader 'participatory democracy turn ' (Bherer et al., 2016) affecting public and private spaces since the 1960's and, more specifically, the autonomous activists in Europe (Flesher Fominaya, 2015) , which have adopted a more 'pragmatic radical reformist strategy' pursuing 'the recuperation and opening up of state institutions' (Gerbaudo, 2017: 2) and more participatory strategies to (re)mobilize their members and citizens (della Porta, 2013).
Additionally, this cycle of contention presented a high degree of transnational diffusion, where the Spanish 15-M movement is considered to be 'a model for European anti-austerity movements with far reaching influence', and its epicentre, Acamapada Sol, the 'most influential square in Europe' (Flesher Fominaya, 2017: 11) . Its claims for 'Real Democracy Now!', squarely directed at national oligarchies, found resonance in other parts of the globe, e.g. shaping the protests of Occupy Wall Street (OWS) (Lawrence, 2012; Romanos, 2016b) . As this cycle of contention clearly shows, transnational diffusion processes are complex and reciprocal, rather than linear as transmitter-adopter models would suggest (see Romanos, in this volume).
Explaining differences between European anti-austerity mobilizations
Although mobilizations were partly a response to the crisis, the economic effects of the crisis and austerity policies are insufficient to explain their variations across countries strongly affected (Flesher Fominaya, 2017) . Movements' characteristics do not fully explain, either, large differences in mobilizations results of the same organizers; i.e. why some autonomous groups had difficulties mobilizing broader support in some circumstances, while the same organizations played a paramount role in organizing mass mobilizations a few months later (Peterson et al., 2015) . The high situational variability in this cycle of contention draws attention also to a list (necessarily incomplete here) of other factors that should be considered.
Frames and Public Trust
In the early stages of the cycle of contention, trade unions were the single most active civil society actor organizing protest in most countries, thanks to their capacity to mobilize their members and their resources as bureaucratic organizations, and mostly projecting their conventional messages of resistance to the loss of labour rights. Nevertheless, they mostly obtained a rather moderate impact in terms of mobilizing new social groups and having greater social resonance, arguably due to a long-term erosion of public trust in most of the European countries. However, autonomous actors across Europe 'perceive[d] the crisis as a political crisis rather than a reaction to austerity' (Kaldor & Selchow, 2013:78) and, once these mobilizations started, their resonance across mainstream public opinion was unusually loud (Flesher Fominaya, 2017: 9) 
Public Demand for Mobilization
Differences in characteristics and strategies of movements are crucial but also insufficient to explain their impact. A contextual translation of a 'new model' of mobilization (the square movements' organizing without organizations) did not guarantee high impacts, yet other factors outside the movements were of great importance in the mobilization ecosystem. Arguably, promoters' strategies and characteristics are constantly engaging with a certain public demand for mobilization (e.g. Klandermans, 2013) . The increase in this demand may help to explain the increase in the mobilizing capacity of some groups in a matter of months. This public demand sympathizes with some groups' characteristics more than with others, and with some types of protest more than others, causing differences in their ability to mobilize.
In this behalf, the way the 15M emerged is linked with the specific political opportunities present in the Spanish case. The successful organizers' call took place one week before the regional and municipal elections, whereas previous similar calls didn't have that effect. The particular media structure and attention to political events during the electoral campaign favoured a rapid diffusion of the initial events across mass media. Hence, cases of rapid and massive mobilization (such as the 15M and the Gilets jaunes) would correspond to contexts of high public demand for mobilization with widespread, deeply felt indignation (Walgrave & Manssens, 2000) where organizers successfully connected their frames with a broad and cross-sectional consensus (Lobera, 2015) , recruiting high proportions of unaffiliated demonstrators thought 'open' communication channels (Klandermans et al., 2014) , such as mass media, online social networks, friends and acquaintances.
Practices, Spaces and Experience
A sustained participation beyond episodic mass mobilizations was facilitated by the use of deliberative democratic practices in large public assemblies as a central organizing principle (Flesher Fominaya, 2014) . This occurred in contexts of high erosion of political legitimacy, remarkably in Spain and Greece, 'as people withdrew commitment to the social order, creating spaces for alternative views and understandings ' (Langman, 2013: 159) . The peaceful and sustained occupations of public spaces in the center of the cities allowed the development of an eventful 'continuous protest', having relevant cognitive, affective and relational transformative impacts on its participants (della Porta, 2008) . In this vein, Dhaliwal (2012: 256) notes that these occupations were 'not simply a seizure and reorganization of physical space, conceived as an instrumental resource for the purposes of mobilization and publicity', but they were also 'attempts to produce an alternative form of public space' undergirding a sustained transformation of social relations.
Flesher Fominaya's (2017: 8) research on Spain and Ireland shows that the presence of experienced activists was also crucial for sustaining mobilization: activists in Madrid and Barcelona 'drew on long-standing autonomous practices in and beyond the 20 GJM, to organize their assemblies (with facilitators, moderators, rules of engagement, etc.)' while activists in Dublin 'struggled to establish shared codes of practice that could integrate participants effectively'. In the absence of a strong core of experienced activists, movements faced more difficulties in their ability to sustain horizontal assembly practices. Pre-existing networks and urban spaces of resistance were paramount in the evolution of the protests after the acampadas were lifted. As Flesher Fominaya stresses (2017: 8), if Madrid's 'Indignados' could decide to 'go back to the neighbourhoods' it was because they had somewhere to go (e.g. squatted social centres, neighbourhood association locales), while Irish activists struggled with a scarcity of available meeting spaces and their mobilization declined until it was unsustainable.
Media, Diffusion and Timing
Mainstream media and its ability to influence public opinion are deemed to be very important external factors for a movement's efforts to mobilize political support, to reinforce the legitimacy of its demands, and to allow it to broaden the scope of conflict beyond those who are like-minded (Koopmans, 2004) . In the case of the anti-austerity movement in the UK, mainstream media resonance was mixed (Cammaerts, 2018) , while in the Spanish case it was predominantly positive in its emergence phase, even among right-wing TV stations. Furthermore, violence or its media framing were demobilizing factors in certain cases, such as Italy (Zamponi, 2012) and the UK (Cammaerts, 2018) .
These cases connect with evidences showing that perceived violence can potentially reduce public support for the protesters' movement and, thus, potential participation (e.g. Anduiza & Muñoz, 2017) , as well as enhancing elite's discourses based on public order maintenance (Wasow, 2017) .
Additionally, cultural and linguistic differences were of great importance in the way transnational diffusion took place (e.g. Gerbaudo, 2012; Romanos, 2016b) . In this diffusion, timing mattered to a great extent. As Zamponi (2012) Flesher Fominaya, 2015 , 2017 , and connective action mechanisms (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013) , paramount to the emergence of the Gilets jaunes.
A key factor contributing to the demand of this type of mobilization is a high degree of 'affiliation distrust' among several social groups, leading to the point that the presence of unions or partisan organizations would discourage participation. Some potential demonstrators prefer not to attend to a protest to avoid giving support to any conventional organization or to their leaders: they may fear that their political involvement could be used as a sort of backing or 'soft affiliation' by some organizers in order to legitimize their position. Some observers even point out that a part of the Gilets jaunes movement extended their hatred of politicians to any 'would-be politicians who emerge from their own ranks' (Lichfield, 2018: 1).
I understand this affiliation distrust as a diffuse expression of the long-run crisis of institutional representation (Norris, 2011) , that adds to the rest of the mechanisms identified by Klandermans et al (2014) affecting the proportion of unaffiliated demonstrators: 1) the universalistic or particularistic type of the protest, and 2) the individual's level of embeddedness in multi-organizational fields. Thus, the number of trade union or partisan flags and placards in universalistic demonstrations would be, roughly, inversely proportional to the number of unaffiliated demonstrators and the less socially embedded citizens. For this type of protesters, a horizontal organization has the advantage of avoiding 'being used' by visible leaders to play in the representative field.
The increasingly relevance of affiliation distrust in protests implies a rising need for the study of the dynamics of mobilization without flags, which potentially may lead to rapid processes with a high degree of social cross-sectional support among the public (Sampedro & Lobera, 2014) , coming into play the mass media coverage (Walgrave & Manssens, 2000) , the effect of experienced activists and autonomous movements (Flesher Fominaya, 2015 , 2017 Juris, 2012) , online social networking (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013) , and the dynamics of public opinion and consensus building (Gamson, 1992; Klandermans, 2013) .
There is no disintermediation, but new intermediations in the organization of the participants. The gap left by membership organizations can be taken by experienced activists (as in the case of 15M) and by a greater weight of connective platforms (as in the emergence of the Gilets jaunes). How these new intermediations are produced will determine, to a large extent, the evolution and nature of mobilizations without membership organizations. For instance, scholarship shows that less affiliated participants decide to participate at a later point in time (Klandermans et al., 2014) , but 23 in the Gilets jaunes case we can observe the opposite mechanism: the initiators (individual unexperienced activists) were little embedded in organizational fields, so they rely on open channels (mainly Facebook, mass media, and interpersonal networks), recruiting mainly unaffiliated participants in a first stage. In this case, after a few weeks of doubts due to the marked nationalist, and occasionally racist, discourse of the movement in its phase of emergence (Nabli, 2018) , left organizations and affiliated participants joined, influencing the evolution of the protests and taking their demands to more conventional positions of left activism (Damgé, 2018) . This reverse dynamic (more affiliated participants adding later to the mobilization) may imply a series of challenges.
The emergence of massive, rapid, non-membership mobilizations (such as the 15M and the Gilets jaunes) challenges the traditional dynamics of contentious politics.
Traditionally, political and social change has been mostly explained as the ability of organizations, social movements, or revolutionary parties to mobilize oppressed groups against a status quo. In this 'push' dynamics, the organization cognitively liberates and organize the individuals and, in return, receives their commitment, the uniformity of the 
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Without a known organization flag, without a previous record of actions, mobilizations without organizations may be articulated around meanings that are plastic or floating: democracy, citizenship, justice. This allows the construction of a populist identity, uniting protesters in their struggle: 'us' (that are the unjust victims of austerity measures) against 'them' (representing an economic and a political elite) (see Woodward, this volume). Massive mobilization around these meanings can produce the emergence of a 'plastic moment', in which 'everything seems possible' and new crossclass alliances may be established (Lobera & Parejo, 2019) . In the Spanish case, the presence of experienced left-wing activists allowed the adoption of forms of mobilization of the GJM, favouring the development of an inclusive populist mobilization.
Bearing this in mind, is there a risk that a 'plastic moment' could lead to an exclusive populist logic? Could this type of mobilization be overflowed by experienced right-wing activists? My hypothesis is yes, since there is arguably a primacy of the signifier over the signified (Lacan, 1993) , both in mass communication and in connective action. From this perspective, issues traditionally framed by progressive social movements may be appropriated by the far right, as indeed seems to have happened in early stages of the Gilets jaunes movement. In short, experienced activists will have a particularly decisive role in shaping the ideological/political orientation of this type of rapid, massive and demand-driven mobilization.
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